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THE CLIENT WHO DID TOO MUCH∗ 
Nancy B. Rapoport∗∗ 
The whole point of the MacGuffin is that it is irrelevant. In 
Hitchcock’s own words, the MacGuffin is: 
the device, the gimmick, if you will, or the papers the spies are 
after. . .[.] The only thing that really matters is that in the picture 
the plans, documents or secrets must seem to be of vital 
importance to the characters. To me, the narrator, they’re of no 
importance whatsoever. 
Angus McPhail, who may have been the first to coin the term, 
explained its meaning with a nonsense story.  Two men were travelling 
on a train from London to Scotland.  An odd shaped package sat on the 
luggage rack above their seat. 
“What have you there?” asked one of the men. 
“Oh, that’s a MacGuffin,” replied his companion. 
“What’s a MacGuffin?”“It’s a device for trapping lions in the 
Scottish Highlands.”“But there aren’t any lions in the Scottish 
Highlands!”“Well, then, I guess that’s no MacGuffin!” 
The MacGuffin is the engine that sets the story in motion. 
 -Alfred Hitchcock1 
 
In Alfred Hitchcock’s The Man Who Knew Too Much,2 a married 
couple becomes enmeshed in an assassination plot purely by 
∗ © Nancy B. Rapoport 2013.  All rights reserved. 
∗∗ Interim Dean and Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV.  
The views in this essay are mine alone and not those of the Boyd School of Law or UNLV, as you 
can probably guess from the way that the essay is written.  Special thanks to the Joseph G. Miller 
and William C. Becker Center for Professional Responsibility for inviting me to participate in this 
symposium, and to Jeff Van Niel, Katharine Van Tassel, and Morris Rapoport for their helpful 
comments. 
 1.  Mark Duguid, Hitchcock and the MacGuffin, BFI SCREENONLINE, 
http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tours/hitch/tour6.html (italics added). 
 2.  THE MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH (Paramount Pictures 1956). 
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happenstance.3  Although they don’t care one way or another about the 
target of the plot, they have to decide whether to stop the assassination 
or stand aside and let it happen.  In the end, they have to weigh the 
importance of helping a perfect stranger or protecting (spoiler alert!) 
their son.4 
As with any Hitchcock movie, The Man Who Knew Too Much has a 
MacGuffin — the motivator for the protagonist’s actions that advances 
the storyline.5  Cases have their MacGuffins, too.  The clients in a case 
(and their lawyers) are likely to care passionately about certain things 
that, to the rest of the world, are often of no particular interest.  A case’s 
MacGuffin will be the focus of discovery and of argument, and clients 
and lawyers alike will spend significant amounts of time debating the 
MacGuffin, planning the best ways to present it, and theorizing about 
any MacGuffins on the other side. 
A client’s input about her6 case — including any MacGuffins — is 
crucial.  In the world of “who knows the most,” the client (and the party 
on the other side) will always know the most about the facts of the case; 
then comes her lawyer (and the lawyer on the other side); and last comes 
the judge, who really only knows those facts that the lawyers choose to 
share with him.7  Depending on the personalities and skill levels of a 
client and her lawyer, there can be tension between how the lawyer 
wants to present the case and how the client wants it presented.  Even 
though Model Rule 1.2 sets out the division of authority between the 
client and the lawyer,8 there is no clear line of demarcation.9  The 
 3.  Stop reading this paragraph and skip to the next one if you don’t want me to spoil the plot 
for you. 
 4.  In the first (also-Hitchcockian) version, the child in question is a daughter.  The two 
versions have strengths and weaknesses.  The first one has Peter Lorre (as the villain) and Edna Best 
(who shows real turmoil in the Albert Hall scene); the second one has Jimmy Stewart and Doris Day 
as the couple caught in the middle.  Doris Day tries to show the same level of anguish in the Albert 
Hall scene, but she’s just not as good as Edna Best. 
 5.  See, e.g., Duguid, supra note 1.  There are several websites devoted to the various 
MacGuffins in Hitchcock’s movies.  See id.; see also Jeffrey Michael Bays, Definitive List of 
Hitchcock MacGuffins, BORGUS.COM, http://borgus.com/hitch/macguffins.htm.  For a video of 
Hitchcock discussing the MacGuffin, see Interview by Dick Cavett with Alfred Hitchcock (1972), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBRZ6GEFjG4. 
 6.  To avoid confusion, I’m going to refer to clients as “she” and lawyers as “he.”  Don’t 
read anything into that choice.  It’s just a convention. 
 7.  My friend Ted Gavin has told me that being a judge is like sitting alone in a dark room 
with a television, turning the television on fifteen minutes into a show, turning it off again five 
minutes later, and then asking the judge to write the entire one-hour script. 
 8.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) provides, in part, that “a lawyer 
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by 
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” 
 9.  Id. at cmt. 2 provides: 
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common wisdom is that the client decides the objectives of the 
representation and the lawyer determines how best to achieve those 
objectives.10  But what happens when the client directs the lawyer to do 
something unnecessary or wasteful? 
I first became aware of the effect of a lawyer pursuing actions 
based on pressure from his client while doing work as a bankruptcy fee 
examiner.11  Before I can describe the phenomenon in more detail, 
though, let me set out the parameters that triggered my attention in the 
first place. 
Bankruptcy cases, like other types of fee-shifting12 cases, often 
have non-clients paying some of the legal bills.  “Estate-paid” 
professionals in bankruptcy can include the debtor-in-possession’s 
lawyers, accountants, financial advisors, and other assorted 
professionals, as well as the professionals hired by the creditors’ 
committee or other official committees in the case.13  Even my own fees 
and expenses as a fee examiner are paid from estate funds.  (Those estate 
funds are sometimes funded from a carve-out of a secured creditor’s 
On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to 
accomplish the client’s objectives. Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and 
skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, 
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers 
usually defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and 
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature 
of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in 
question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not 
prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. 
 10.  See, e.g., Glenn E. Bradford, Who’s Running the Show? Decision-Making in the 
Courtroom in Civil and Criminal Cases, 62 J. MO. B. 148, 150 (2006). 
 11.  I’ve been doing a fair amount of that type of work.  For discussions of what I’ve found as 
a fee examiner, see Nancy B. Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11, 7 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 117, 149-151 (2012); Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Fees in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263 (2010); Letter from Nancy B. Rapoport, Interim Dean and Gordon 
Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, to Exec. Office of the United 
States Trustee, (Nov. 6, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo
/rules_regulations/guidelines/docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_Comment2.pdf; Letter from Nancy B. 
Rapoport, Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, to Exec. 
Office of the United States Trustee, (May 1, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
ust/eo/rules_regulations/guidelines/docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_SupplementalComment.pdf; 
(Dec. 14, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/rules_regulations/guidelines/
docs/proposed/Prof_Rapoport_Comment.pdf. 
 12.  For a discussion of how some bankruptcy courts have applied non-bankruptcy fee-
shifting cases to bankruptcy cases, see, e.g., C.R. “Chip” Bowles, Jr., Fee Enhancements: Rare and 
Exceptional, 30-MAY AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 80 (2011).  For a classic non-bankruptcy fee-shifting 
case, see, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010). 
 13.  See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 327, 328, 330, 331, 1102 (West 2013); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 
2014, 2016. 
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collateral; in other words, part of the value of the secured creditor’s 
collateral goes to pay those estate-paid professionals.)  Often, though, 
the funds to pay estate-paid professionals come from funds that would 
otherwise be distributed to the debtor’s unsecured creditors.  In that 
more frequent situation, the unsecured creditors are essentially reaching 
into their own pockets — on a pro rata basis — to pay those 
professionals who are assisting the debtor, the creditors’ committee, and 
the like.  A single unsecured creditor isn’t paying the bill; the collective 
group of unsecured creditors is paying that bill. 
I’ve written before about what the diffusion of responsibility for 
those bills does in terms of curbing their size.14  In essence, when no 
single client is responsible for paying a professional’s bills, the 
likelihood that those bills will be scrutinized goes down dramatically.  
There’s a big difference between the level of scrutiny that a client gives 
a bill that will be paid from his own budget and the level of scrutiny that, 
say, the chair of a creditors’ committee gives to a bill that reduces the 
unsecured creditors’ recovery by a percent or two.  Stories abound on 
how general counsel are refusing to pay for the work done by summer 
associates or by first- and second-year lawyers15 and refusing to allow 
firms to increase their hourly rates automatically.16  Those general 
counsel are “bill watchdogs,” but that’s because the watchdogs are 
guarding their own budgets.  When someone other than the client is 
bearing the cost, there’s often no watchdog around.17 
The diffusion of responsibility for monitoring the estate-paid 
professional’s bill is what makes me so sensitive when I review bills as a 
fee examiner.  Much of bankruptcy work is reactive — depending on the 
actions that one party in interest takes, other parties in interest have to 
react to the action with actions of their own, creating a ripple effect of 
legal fees.18  It’s a bit like watching a game of pool.  A player strikes one 
ball, and that ball may cause several other balls to move. 
When an action is necessary, of course, many of the reactions will 
 14.  See discussion supra note 11. 
 15.  See, e.g., Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a First-Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970
204774604576631360989675324.html?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&cb=logged0.7879950232420504
#. 
 16.  See, e.g., Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Face Fresh Backlash Over Fees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
22, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203400604578070611725856952.html. 
 17.  Other than the lawyer.  (And, in bankruptcy cases, the court and the Office of the United 
States Trustee.). 
 18.  The ripple effect also holds true when other estate-paid professionals (such as financial 
advisors) take actions that cause reactions. 
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also be necessary.19  But an unnecessary action will cause many hours of 
reactions — some necessary in themselves, and possibly some that 
aren’t necessary.  Let’s say that a client pressures her lawyer to file an 
unnecessary motion.  Someone (maybe more than one party) will file an 
opposition, which will in turn trigger a reply to the opposition.  It’s not 
an exaggeration to say that one unnecessary action — in this example, 
one unnecessary motion — could trigger numerous reactions.  And those 
actions and reactions, of course, will generate countless hours of fees.20 
Occasionally, I’ve discovered internal actions (actions only 
between the client and her lawyer) that have also seemed odd.  These 
internal actions might never trigger reactions from the opposing party, 
because they might never see the light of day;21 nonetheless, those 
actions generated unnecessary legal work.  The best examples come 
from my review of bills that reflected a significant amount of activity by 
the client in editing the lawyer’s work product.  Those edits, in turn, 
required a lot of client-lawyer discussions and re-edits, and the legal fees 
increased exponentially.  The entries looked something like this: 
Day 1  Send draft to client 0.1 
Day 2   Telephone conference with client re draft 1.0 
Day 3   Review and revise client’s revised draft 2.0 
Day 4   Discuss revised draft with client; resend draft 0.5 
Day 5  Telephone conference with client re draft 1.5 
You get the point.  The client was rewriting the lawyer’s draft — 
and not because the draft was wrong as to any of the facts.  The client 
was rewriting the draft because she didn’t like some of the words that 
the lawyer used in the draft.  The lawyer spent unnecessary time22 
dealing with a client who wanted to play both roles (client and lawyer).  
In part, the client might just have been persnickety.23  In part, though, 
the client knew that the legal bills were going to come out of someone 
 19.  Some, though, aren’t strictly necessary, such as filing a pleading that agrees with some 
other party’s position on an issue.  I call those pleadings the “me, too” pleadings. 
 20.  Even when estate-paid lawyers are dealing with necessary actions, they might do so in 
wasteful ways.  I’ve certainly seen examples of activity that seemed to exceed what was reasonably 
necessary.  For example, there’s nothing wrong with filing a statement that says “me, too” to 
someone else’s motion.  But there’s something wrong when a simple, two-page “me, too” statement 
takes a full billable hour to draft.  There’s also something wrong when a party files an eight-page 
motion for stay relief for which the bill lists upwards of thirty hours.  (For folks reading this essay 
who aren’t familiar with stay relief motions, let’s just say that large portions of those motions can be 
cribbed from stay relief motions in other cases.)  But overbilling and overstaffing are two issues that 
I’ve discussed elsewhere and won’t discuss here.  See supra note 11. 
 21.  Unless, of course, that lawyer submits a request to have his fees paid with estate funds. 
 22.  And certainly more time than was reasonable. 
 23.  Rather like law review editors who want to take out all of my contractions. 
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else’s pocket.24  My guess is that the diffusion of responsibility for those 
legal fees contributed to the client’s willingness to do a line-by-line edit 
of her lawyer’s work. 
There has to be a way of drawing a line between normal client-
lawyer interactions and those that unnecessarily drive up the fees in a 
case.  When the client is paying those fees herself, of course, it is her 
choice as to how much extra work she wants to ask her lawyer to do.25  
But in situations in which someone other than the lawyer is paying the 
client’s fees, the question of when a client should “help” the lawyer do 
the lawyer’s job — or urge the lawyer to do more on a case than the 
lawyer thinks is reasonable — should not be based solely on the client’s 
own preferences. 
There are many ways in which a client’s actions can increase her 
own lawyer’s fees.  She can — as some Chapter 11 clients with estate-
paid professionals might want to do — urge her professionals to leave no 
stone unturned.26  Moreover, a client can call her lawyer (or e-mail, or 
write to her lawyer) with a frequency that approaches obsession.  Those 
multiple communications can add up, especially if a lawyer charges his 
minimum rate for every time that he responds to a client’s question.27  
Or a client can have a vendetta against the opposing party and instruct 
her lawyer to pull every (legal) trick in the book to make the litigation 
 24.  At the symposium, Professor Susan Cable pointed out, quite correctly, that the lawyer 
could have (and should have) billed the client directly for that behavior, rather than billing the 
estate. 
 25.  That’s not the end of the issue, though.  Vexatious litigation and other stalling tactics 
aren’t kosher, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1-3.2 (2012), so a lawyer 
shouldn’t indulge a client’s whims in a way that increases the other side’s fees unnecessarily.   
 26.  And when lawyers are representing clients who are themselves fiduciaries for others, then 
there’s a real push to leave no stone unturned.  The client has duties to her beneficiary.  The lawyer 
has fiduciary duties to his client. As one of my favorite authors has explained in discussing a 
lawyer’s fiduciary duties, “[t]here are three core aspects to fiduciary duties: a duty of loyalty, a duty 
of care, and a duty of impartiality in the event of multiple beneficiaries.”  Susan M. Freeman, Are 
DIP and Committee Counsel Fiduciaries for Their Clients’ Constituents or the Bankruptcy Estate? 
What Is a Fiduciary, Anyway?, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 291, 338-39 (2009).  The duty of 
loyalty places the interests of the beneficiary above that of the fiduciary.  The duty of care “requires 
that the fiduciary act with the care and skill that is standard in that locality for the fiduciary’s work 
and level of skill.”  Id. at 340.  The duty of impartiality requires that — when the fiduciary has more 
than one beneficiary — the fiduciary not prefer one of the beneficiaries to others.  Of these three 
duties, the one that’s implicated by “cover your butt” lawyering has to do with the duty of care.  In 
order to avoid accusations that the fiduciary didn’t do enough to protect his beneficiary, the 
fiduciary might decide to do “too much” rather than risk being accused of doing too little.  That 
decision might be fine in terms of the duty of care, but it might not be fine in terms of keeping fees 
reasonable.  (Unreasonable fees, of course, could also affect the conclusion of whether the lawyer 
met his duty of care.) 
 27.  Of course, that’s a whole other ethics issue right there: charging fees for communications 
that might be thirty seconds long. 
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more expensive for the other side.  If a lawyer’s duty is to keep his fees 
reasonable,28 does the lawyer have a corresponding obligation to control 
his client’s behavior to avoid driving the bills ever upward? 
The eas(ier) situation: the client as the lawyer’s scrivener. 
What got me started thinking about undue client pressure on a 
lawyer’s work product was the phenomenon of the client who constantly 
redrafts the lawyer’s work product, combined with a lawyer who can’t 
tell his client to stop micromanaging his writing.  I think that the 
economics of law practice today creates, or at least magnifies, that 
problem.29 As Bill Henderson explains, 
[T]he legal services market is gradually being upended by new entrants 
who are offering legal inputs and legal products to law firms, legal 
departments, and average citizens. The principal attraction behind a 
legal input or a legal product is very simple: technology or a better-
designed process is reducing the need for expensive, artisan-trained 
lawyers. In many cases, by removing the lawyer from the value chain, 
cost goes down, quality goes up, and service delivery time becomes 
faster. 
This is a paradigm shift.30 
When the demand for legal services goes down, then the client’s 
ability to exert extra influence on the size and composition of her legal 
fees goes up.31  Law firms get squeezed, and they become increasingly 
nervous about losing their clients’ business.  If most top law firms (big 
or small) have well-credentialed, hard-working, smart lawyers, then it’s 
difficult for them to compete on the basis that “our lawyers are better 
 28.   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2012). 
 29.  For a good discussion of the changes, see, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for 
Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 461-462 (2013); Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But 
Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 92 (2011). 
 30.  Henderson, supra note 29, at 479 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).  Law 
schools are reacting to this paradigm shift.  They’re cutting their entering class sizes, and they’re 
trying to create incubators in which their recent graduates can work.  See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Top 
Law School Cuts Admissions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324281004578354490114584144.html; Ethan 
Bronner, To Place Graduates, Law Schools Are Opening Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/law-schools-look-to-medical-education-
model.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 31.  More and more clients are refusing to pay for first- and second-year associates’ work, for 
summer associates’ work, and for automatic billing increases.  See, e.g., Claire Zillman, Law Firm 
Leaders Survey 2010: The New Normal, AM. LAW. (ONLINE) (Dec. 1, 2010); see also David Segal, 
What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-
lawyers.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&ref=business. 
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than their lawyers.”  It’s like Lake Wobegon: all the lawyers are strong 
(and good-looking).32  If all of the potential lawyers are good, then 
they’d best be competing on the basis of providing faster and more 
complete33 service.34 
But the problem with trying to “out-service” the other law firms by 
catering to clients is that, sometimes, a client is flat-out wrong.  We’ve 
seen frivolous lawsuits that a lawyer never should have filed — but for 
greed.35  We’ve seen deals go through that make no long-term economic 
sense — except for greed.  And we’ve seen lawyers kowtow to clients 
 32.  The closing line to Garrison Keillor’s Prairie Home Companion public radio show is: 
“Well, that’s the news from Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are good 
looking, and all the children are above average.”  See generally Mitch Tuchman, The Investment 
News From ‘Lake Wobegon,’ FORBES (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mitchelltuchman/2013/03/08/the-investment-news-from-lake-
wobegon/ (explaining the origin of the oft-cited closing line and what has become known as “the 
Lake Wobegon effect”).  
 33.  I was going to say “more obsequious,” but my husband stopped me. 
 34.  Professor Katharine Van Tassel, who was kind enough to read an earlier draft of this 
essay, suggested an intriguing analogy to health care.  She taught me that there are two types of 
“overuse” concepts that might relate to “overlawyering”: supply-sensitive overuse and preference-
sensitive overuse.  As Professor Van Tassel explained to me:  
Supply-sensitive care is care for which the supply of a specific resource (for example, 
number of physicians, hospital beds or specialized testing equipment) heavily influences 
the customary amount of care provided . . . . This type of overuse is linked to the ‘more 
is better’ myth . . . .  Preference-sensitive care occurs when a condition has multiple 
possible treatment options, each with its own benefits and risks, and the type of care 
depends on the physician’s preference . . . .   
E-mail from Katharine A. Van Tassel, Professor, The Univ. of Akron School of Law, to author 
(Mar. 27, 2013) (on file with author).  I think the overlawyering that I’m describing has elements of 
both supply-sensitivity and preference-sensitivity.  The “more is better” sensitivity is what 
encourages fiduciaries (e.g., debtors in possession, creditors’ committees) to tell their lawyers to 
leave no stone unturned.  If someone else is paying the lawyers’ bills, then the only limitation on the 
supply of legal work is the 24-hour day.  But see Jason Beahm, Lawyer Bills More Than 24 Hours a 
Day, Gets Suspended, STRATEGIST L. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2010, 5:58 AM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/strategist/2010/08/lawyer-bills-more-than-24-hours-a-day-gets-
suspended.html (describing a situation where the Ohio Supreme Court disciplined an attorney for 
billing more than 24 hours in a day).  Preference-sensitivity, in overlawyering terms, would relate to 
someone’s choice to behave in a scorched-earth fashion, rather than to behave reasonably at first.  
The lawyer whose client protests that he’s “not being mean enough and should yell more at the 
other side” is dealing with preference sensitivity.  In addition to teaching me about the two types of 
sensitivity, Professor Van Tassel coined the word “MacGuffinitus,” which tickles me pink. 
 35.  Many states have enacted statutes to deal with frivolous litigation, cf. Kenneth S. Klein, 
Removing the Blindfold and Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of Ashcroft v. Iqbal Is That 
Frivolous Lawsuits May Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 597-98 (2010) 
(discussing statutes that are attempts to curb frivolous litigation); but as long as there are clients 
who pressure lawyers to pursue it (or greedy lawyers who find clients willing to let them pursue it), 
we’re going to keep having frivolous litigation.  (The sad thing is that a lot of meritorious litigation 
gets swept under the “frivolous” rug because of the way that some news stories portray some 
lawsuits.) 
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who want their lawyers to drive up the other side’s fees and expenses as 
a way of pressuring the other side to give in.  The common refrain of 
those clients?  “If you won’t do what I’m asking, I’ll find another lawyer 
who will.”  And often those clients are right.  There are lawyers who 
“will.” 
There’s a difference between catering to a client’s legitimate 
requests and simply kowtowing to that client out of the fear of losing the 
client’s business.  The hard part is figuring out exactly where the line is 
between those two options.  My theory is that, at least for clients who are 
not law-trained themselves, a part of that line is where the client is 
“playing lawyer” with the lawyer’s drafts.  We absolutely need clients to 
verify the facts on which our work product is based, and we absolutely 
need clients to communicate their goals for the representation.  What we 
don’t need is a client who goes through a line-by-line edit of a lawyer’s 
draft to change “because” to “whereas” because “whereas” sounds more 
“lawyerly.”36 
Again, if the client’s paying the bill and wants to “play lawyer” — 
and the client’s choices aren’t affecting the opposing party — that’s a 
different matter.  When the client isn’t paying the bill, though, we’ve 
lost the checks and balances that help to keep fees reasonable.  Charging 
someone else for the pleasure of doing stylistic edits on the lawyer’s 
draft is a clear waste of time.  It’s also a misallocation of costs, precisely 
because the client isn’t paying the bill. 
So why do lawyers let their clients pick up the red pen for 
wordsmithing purposes, no matter who’s paying the bill?  The lawyers 
who don’t push back likely are feeling the heat from their partners to 
keep fees coming in.  In this economy, with the significant changes in 
how clients are getting legal services, some firms are just running 
scared.  That doesn’t make the behavior right, but it does help to explain 
it.  Let’s assume that there’s a continuum of lawyer behavior that ranges 
from the lawyer taking actions to achieve the client’s legitimate 
objectives to the lawyer taking actions because the client is bullying him 
into it.  The ends of the continuum are legitimate actions on one side and 
 36.  The tougher situation is where the non-law-trained client first makes some reasonable 
suggestions, then starts to suggest more things that smack of stylistic editing, and eventually 
develops a habit of editing everything that the lawyer sends her way.  At some point, the lawyer will 
start asking himself why he’s negotiating word choices with his client.  When should the lawyer 
say, “You know — someone else is going to end up paying my fees on this matter, so perhaps we 
should try to keep them as reasonable as possible?”  I don’t mean to suggest that, just because 
someone other than the client is paying a lawyer’s fees, the lawyer should put the payor’s interests 
above the client’s interests.  A lawyer shouldn’t do that.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.8(f), 1.7 cmt. 13 (2012). 
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wholly unjustified actions on the other side. 
 
When I’ve asked lawyers why they continued to let their clients do 
line-edits of drafts when it was clear that the clients were just 
wordsmithing, I generally heard that the client was a bully who wanted 
to exert control over the lawyer in as many ways as she could:  “I just 
felt that I couldn’t say no.”  To me, that response demonstrates the 
increased pressure on lawyers because of the changes in law practice.  
It’s easy to say no when you have an unlimited number of clients.  When 
you see your client base dwindle, it’s not.37 
 37.  In a declining legal market, there are very few levers that a firm can pull to keep itself out 
of the red — and lots of fixed costs, including payroll.  As the salaries of first-year associates started 
climbing upward to $160,000 at some of the biggest firms, those firms locked themselves into a 
spiral of having to raise their rates (or come up with other ways to maintain those ever-growing 
payrolls) or let workers go to make ends meet.  And it’s not just the starting salaries of first-year 
associates that hemmed in many law firms.  Giving partners guaranteed draws of more than their 
books of business brought in certainly didn’t help, and that was one of the factors that led to the 
demise of Dewey & LeBoeuf.  See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-
bankruptcy/; Martha Neil, Ex-Partner Blames Legal Recruiters, Excessive Pay Guarantees, Angry 
Colleagues for Dewey’s Downfall, ABA J. (May 10, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/former_partner_blames_legal_recruiters_excessive_pay_g
uarantees_for_dewey/. 
  The problem with high fixed costs in a competitive legal market is that something, 
eventually, has to give: either salaries have to go down, or collection of accounts receivable must go 
up.  Even the most prestigious firms are starting to feel pushback on their rates from many of their 
clients, see, e.g., Burk & McGowan, supra note 29, and those sky-high starting salaries are 
beginning to come back down to earth, see, e.g., Median Private Practice Starting Salaries for the 
Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue to Erode, NALP (July 12, 2012), available 
at http://www.nalp.org/classof2011_salpressrel; Ashley Post, Median Starting Salaries Plummet, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (July 13, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/07/13/median-starting-
salaries-plummet; Ashley Post, Median First-Year Associate Salaries Drop to $145,000, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/09/21/median-first-year-
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The problem with a lawyer who feels constrained from saying no to 
a bully is that the lawyers (and their clients) on the other side can be 
affected, too.  In my experience, a client who bullies her own lawyer will 
try to bully the other side as well.  Bullying behavior means that 
reaching agreement on a settlement or a transaction takes exponentially 
longer because the bully, well, just likes to order people around. 
The other explanation that I’ve heard from lawyers who let their 
clients encroach on decisions that should normally be the lawyer’s 
prerogative is that the client became obsessed with the case and wanted 
to stay as involved in it as humanly possible.  Let’s call that explanation 
the “MacGuffin phenomenon”: there’s something embedded in the 
client’s case about which the client cares deeply but which isn’t essential 
to the legal posture of the case.  The client wants to obsess over the 
MacGuffin.  The lawyer (the audience) just wants to move the case (the 
plot) along.  In either the “bullying client” or “obsessing client” 
scenarios, there has to be a point at which the lawyer knows that he’s 
wasting time.  My guess is that, at the time the lawyer notices the wasted 
time, a heck of a lot of already wasted time has passed.  To make matters 
worse, in the situation in which an estate-paid lawyer has wasted some 
time, that lawyer’s likely not to be paid for those wasted hours.  
Bankruptcy courts only allow reasonable fees for estate-paid 
professionals.38  Unreasonable fees, then, don’t get paid from estate 
funds.  The lawyer’s gotten squeezed from both ends: The client has 
persuaded the lawyer to waste time, and the court has determined that 
the wasted time won’t be compensated.39 
I want to focus on the middle-to-left part of the continuum: where 
the client persuades the lawyer to take actions that aren’t completely 
necessary but aren’t obviously unnecessary, either.  There’s no good 
associate-salaries-drop-to-14500; Debra Cassens Weiss, Think $160K Is the Standard BigLaw 
Salary? Think Again, NALP Says, ABA J. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/think_160k_is_the_standard_biglaw_salary_think_again_n
alp_says/.  Even when the starting salaries are staying flat, firms are reacting by hiring fewer 
associates and more contract-type attorneys.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms Express 
‘Growing Enthusiasm’ for Contract Lawyers, ABA J. (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firms_express_growing_enthusiasm_for_contract_law
yers/. 
 38.  See Bowles, Jr., supra note 12, at 80. 
 39.  The client in a bankruptcy case who wants a scorched-earth lawyer is likely pressuring 
the lawyer to do more because extra legal work on the client’s behalf (the action) will cost the other 
side legal fees as well (the reaction) or gain the client some other coveted advantage.  In an 
economy in which clients are exerting significant leverage, as long as there’s one professional out 
there willing to do the dirty work, there will be other lawyers who will bow to the client’s wishes. 
 
11
Rapoport: The Client Who Did Too Much
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
ARTICLE 6 RAPOPORT MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2014  2:06 PM 
132 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:121 
ethics rule for that situation, although the rule regarding withdrawal40 
comes the closest.  Even though we can’t put our fingers on precisely the 
moment at which a client’s request goes from reasonable to 
unreasonable, we’ve all experienced the realization that something that a 
client wants us to do is probably not the best idea in the world. 
 
How can a lawyer whose gut says that he should push back on a client’s 
request justify pushing back when he’s likely to lose that client to 
another lawyer willing to comply with the client’s request?  I’m asking 
that question while knowing full well that, even in the best of 
circumstances, lawyers — who are people first41 — can talk themselves 
into believing that a client request that makes them uncomfortable is 
actually quite reasonable when they think about it some more.  Even 
smart people can talk themselves into just about anything.42 
This issue may be one for which there’s no solution, other than 
asking lawyers to be hyper-aware of the pressures being put on them to 
 40.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2012); especially R. 1.16(b)(4) (withdrawal 
when “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement”). 
 41.  No matter what the lawyer jokes say. 
 42.  There’s lots of good social science literature on this point, much of which I’ve cadged for 
some of my articles, including Nancy B. Rapoport, Black Swans, Ostriches, and Ponzi Schemes, 42 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 627 (2012); Nancy B. Rapoport, The Curious Incident of the Law Firm 
That Did Nothing in the Night-Time, 10 LEGAL ETHICS 98 (2007) (reviewing MILTON C. REGAN, 
JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004)), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017627; see also Rapoport, supra note 11 (The 
Case for Value Billing in Chapter 11 and Rethinking Fees in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases). 
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take some action that might be unnecessary and wasteful.43  At least 
when a third party has the opportunity to weigh in on an action’s 
reasonableness — as a bankruptcy court does in determining whether to 
award fees to an estate-paid individual — there’s a chance that a 
lawyer’s future decisions might be altered.44  (My guess is that it’s a 
slim chance, though; operant conditioning45 might work for some 
people, some of the time, but it clearly doesn’t work for all lawyers 
whose fees have been denied because of their unreasonableness.)  
What’s more likely to change behavior is when a whole lot of legal fees 
go unpaid by the clients who asked for the unnecessary work because, in 
retrospect, the clients themselves didn’t want to pay for work that ended 
up being wasteful.  When the client decides to give up on her own 
MacGuffin, either because she’s had a change of heart or because her 
lawyer has persuaded her that the MacGuffin really is a “nothing,”46 
that’s when we might see some real change. 
 
 43.  Some strategy decisions can be so expensive that they pile up legal fees the size of those 
in Dickens’s BLEAK HOUSE.  See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Bantam Classics 1985). 
 44.  State bars also may weigh in, if the issue of the reasonableness of fees comes before 
them.  See Phil Pattee, Client Chooses the Destination, But You Drive the Boat, 14 NEV. LAW. 34, 
34 (2006): 
Many ethics complaints to the State Bar come from disgruntled clients who claim their 
cases were lost because the lawyer was incompetent.  Unfortunately, we often find that 
the attorney acquiesced to the client’s weird legal theories and followed a flawed course 
of litigation to defeat. Although the underlying cause is a backbone problem as well as 
an ethics problem, the outcome remains a disciplinary and/or malpractice problem. 
 45.  For a definition of “operant conditioning,” see, e.g., Operant Conditioning, ALLEYDOG, 
http://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Operant%20Conditioning (a website 
designed to help students learn about psychology). 
 46.  See Duguid, supra note 1. 
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